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Congressional Testimony on Helping the Long-Term Unemployed
before the 
House Committee on Ways and Means, Human Resources Subcommittee
30 April 1992
Louis Jacobson, Senior Economist 
The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Overview
I am honored to have this opportunity to comment on the new UI bill. In my view 
this bill does an excellent job of providing the means to reestablish the balance between costs 
borne by unemployed workers and those borne by society at large, as well as the balance 
among the three basic types of assistance for the long-term unemployed: cash payments, job 
search assistance, and retraining. In addition, the bill provides the flexibility needed to 
develop new, highly effective, forms of assistance. But unless steps are taken to insure that 
states receive feedback on the effectiveness of various types of assistance the bill could fail to 
establish programs that would deliver adequate services to the long-term unemployed.
Reestablishing the balance betweens costs borne by the unemployed versus costs 
borne by society is appropriate. The availability of unemployment compensation and 
supportive services to aid the long-term unemployed seriously deteriorated over the past ten 
years. During this same period the substantial restructuring of major US industries increased 
the need for such assistance.
Through the REAP program the bill provides the means to restructure key institutions 
to effectively deal with future problems. This too is highly appropriate. Restructuring of the 
US economy will continue to cause major dislocations in response to the decline in domestic 
defense spending, as well as changes in international competition, such as those stemming 
from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Another positive aspect of the bill is that it gives states wide discretion in 
implementing effective programs. There is growing recognition that federal restrictions on 
state and local programs were counter-productive. But more could be done to encourage 
innovation. In addition to returning a portion of the UI payroll tax to the states I suggest 
creating a separate fund to be distributed by the US Department of Labor for use by states to 
try-out, potentially highly effective, but unproven strategies. In particular, wage subsidies 
might dramatically reduce the costs of dislocation borne by workers and government. Yet, 
in the absence of federal assistance, states are unlikely to bear the risk of using new 
approaches.
The one glaring omission from this bill, however, is that it does nothing to insure that 
states competently monitor program effectiveness, and then overtime, modify the programs to 
better meet the needs of the long-term unemployed. Providing adequate feedback is a key
aspect of effective policy design, but unfortunately, often overlooked. As a researcher I am 
acutely aware of the lack of solid information needed to refine policy instruments, but also 
am struck by the growth of our technical ability to provide reliable information at a tiny 
fraction of the total cost of these programs.
Last time I spoke in front of this committee Desert Storm had just begun and I noted 
the analogy between the fog of war and lack of accurate information about the effectiveness 
of social programs. Over the past few weeks, however, a great deal of the fog of war has 
lifted as Congress reviewed the military's own analyses of what actually happened. A 
critical review is essential to avoid repeating mistakes. Given that war places the lives of 
hundreds of thousands of young Americans at risk, we expect no less.
The irony is that the lives of millions of American families are placed at risk by 
economic changes, but insufficient attention is given to the effectiveness of government 
programs aimed at saving those lives. Thus, my most important recommendation is for the 
US Department of Labor (DOL) to be given the mandate and the resources needed to 
rigorously evaluate services under REAP and other programs to aid the long-term 
unemployed.
The remainder of this statement amplifies the above remarks.
Extending Unemployment Insurance
The protection offered by the Extended Benefit (EB) program has seriously 
deteriorated over the past ten years. EB triggered on in all states that were hard hit by 
unemployment 1979 through 1982. But except in a few isolated instances, EB has not 
triggered on during the current recession.
In many states the current recession is milder than that in the early 1980's. But in 
states where recent economic conditions would have triggered EB in the early 1980's 
institutional changes prevented the program from taking effect. The level of the Insured 
Unemployment rate (IUR) required to trigger EB was raised one percentage point in 1981. 
More important, the IUR fell in relation to the Total Unemployment (TUR). In 1979 close 
to 2 out of 5 unemployed workers received UI, in 1989 only about 1 out 5 received UI.
The insured unemployment rate fell largely because of changes in the UI system that 
made receiving UI more difficult. Thus, greater economic distress is now required to trigger 
EB than formerly. Redressing the institutional changes is important to reestablish a 
reasonable balance between costs borne by workers and those borne by society at large. But 
adjusting the trigger is not quite as simple as suggested in the new bill.
Switching from the IUR to the TUR poses a technical problem. The Current 
Population Survey (CPS) based TUR is not accurately measured for every state. Using CPS
measures with high variance to allocate millions of dollars has led states to successfully sue 
the federal government to establish "fairer" measures. But even ignoring the threat of 
litigation, a high variance measure has the undesirable attribute of causing purely statistical 
gyrations that would cause EB to trigger on in one quarter, and then trigger off the next 
without any real change in economic conditions.
Expanding the CPS could eliminate the above problem, but would be expensive. On 
obvious alternative is to lower the IUR trigger. A problem with that approach is that the 
trigger would have to be changed periodically to insure EB would trigger-on during 
comparable downturns.
A better alternative would be to retain use of the state IUR as the EB trigger, but 
automatically adjust the trigger threshold so that the trigger would be "pulled" at a constant 
national TUR level. Use of the national IUR/TUR ratio to adjust the state trigger would 
make it easier for EB to trigger-on in states where the IUR/TUR ratio fell less than average 
since 1979, but the switch to the TUR would make it harder for EB to trigger-on in such 
states. In my view during a recession it is appropriate to provide more assistance to states 
that bear larger UI payment burdens. 1
The provisions in the new bill to continue Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
(EUC) and insure an orderly phase-out also are in keeping with protection offered in the 
early 1980's. In addition to EB triggering-on in high-unemployment states, the Federal 
Supplemental Compensation (FSC) program added additional protection. Thus, in the early 
1980's most workers in severely distressed areas were covered by 26 weeks of regular UI, 
13 weeks of EB, plus 13 weeks of FSC.
Job Search Assistance
The most innovative element of the new bill is funding a Reemployment Assistance 
Program (REAP). I am enthusiastic about this measure because it has the potential to restore 
resources that formerly were available for reemployment services through state Employment 
Services (ESs). The federal ES budget declined by about 10 percent in inflation adjusted 
dollars over the last decade. At the same time the mission of the ES was expanded and 
overall use of the ES often increased. In Pennsylvania, for example, resources per ES 
registrant fell about 25 percent. As a result state ES's became so strapped for resources they
1 A minor drawback even of this approach is that changes in the UI system are not the 
only factor affecting the IUR/TUR ratio. Some of those factors, such as changing 
demographics, could be taken into account by using the ratio of the IUR to the CPS 
unemployment rate for prime-age workers.
were forced to close offices, cut back some services, and discontinued others including 
counseling and job search workshops.
Yet research performed by Arnold Katz of the University of Pittsburgh and me has 
shown that the Pennsylvania ES provided highly cost-effective services to the long-term 
unemployed. The accuracy of those findings are supported by the only other major ES 
evaluation a 29 state DOL study completed about ten years ago by Terry Johnson and his 
colleagues at Stanford Research International (SRI).
Careful reviews of the literature on assisting dislocated workers conducted 
independently by Duane Leigh of Washington State University and Robert Lalonde of the 
University of Chicago reached very similar conclusions. They both found that job search 
assistance was equally effective as retraining, just far less expensive. Each ES placements 
costs only about $250. Job search workshops and job-finding clubs often are even less 
expensive per participant.
These results make perfect sense. There is overwhelming evidence that the long-run 
earnings reductions experienced by dislocated manufacturing workers is strongly related to 
whether or not those workers find similar jobs. For example, Bob Lalonde, Dan Sullivan 
and I found that in Pennsylvania dislocated manufacturing workers with at least five years of 
tenure experienced earnings reductions of about 25 percent if they found manufacturing jobs. 
If, however, they left the manufacturing sector, reductions were 45 percent, 20 percentage 
points more.
It is reasonable to believe that high tenure workers have rusty job search skills as well 
as overly optimistic expectations concerning the initial pay of jobs they could obtain. Thus, 
effective job search assistance could reduce the duration of joblessness, and most important, 
ultimately lead workers who otherwise would end up in the non-manufacturing sector to 
manufacturing jobs. The above evidence suggests returning to the manufacturing sector 
would on average boost earnings by 20 percentage points.
An important reason that job search assistance is under-valued is the widespread, but 
erroneous, view that "good" jobs using displaced workers' existing skills are unavailable 
during a recession. Fortunately, studies using plant level data are beginning to dispel the 
notion that hiring ceases during periods where industry employment falls sharply. When 
employment is partitioned into growing and declining plants it is evident that growing plants 
in declining industries experience large net employment increases.
Even more persuasive evidence is derived from tracking plant level entrances and 
exits of individual workers. For example, my research showed that from 1979 through 1983 
manufacturing firms in Pittsburgh hired workers equal to 15 percent of 1979 employment, 
even though overall manufacturing employment declined by 30 percent during that period.
Only a small part of the hiring was due to plant expansions. Most of the hiring was 
required to replace workers who voluntarily quit or retired. This means that there were 
plenty of opportunities to remain in manufacturing during a period where the steel industry 
experienced one of the most precipitous declines in history.
That many hiring opportunities exist during a recession does not negate the 
conventional wisdom that recessions substantially reduce hiring. From 1986 through 1989, a 
relatively prosperous period in Pittsburgh, hiring in manufacturing equaled 40 percent of 
1986 employment, more than twice recessionary levels. But the increased competition for 
available manufacturing jobs in a recession is likely to increase, not diminish, the importance 
of job search assistance. 2
Training
Over the last ten years funding for UI compensation and ES job search assistance fell 
relative to the demand for those services. In contrast, federal funding for training programs 
targeted on the long-term unemployed rose substantially under title-Ill of the Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) and its successor the Economic Dislocated Worker Adjustment Act 
(EDWAA).
EDWAA programs spend considerable sums on job development (direct placement), 
job search assistance, and counseling. Thus, they potentially could fill the gaps created by 
the decline of the ES. But EDWAA is not an adequate substitute for ES assistance. 
Vocational training is EDWAA 1 s core service. As a result the average cost per enrollee is 
over $2,5000, and therefore, the program can aid only a small fraction of the long-term 
unemployed.
Further, EDWAA lacks the close contact with the long-term unemployed of the UI-ES 
system. UI claimants are periodically called in for interviews to monitor job search, but are 
not necessarily referred to EDWAA. This is beginning to change as states integrate ES and 
JTPA operations. Even the President has taken note of the value of one-stop shopping for 
adjustment services. But, in contrast to the administration's proposal, REAP provides the 
funding needed to improve services.
2 Admittedly, there are isolated labor markets where the demise of major employers 
creates situations where there are almost no jobs available. For example, even today the 
economic devastation in the Mon Valley close to Pittsburgh resembles that of Ruhr Valley at 
the end of World War II. Even the most skillful job search limited to those areas often 
would be fruitless. But retraining would be equally unlikely to lead to local hiring.
In my view a fundamental problem with EDWAA is that the merits of alternative 
services have not been carefully evaluated. As noted above, there is considerable evidence 
that the emphasis on training is misplaced. Although some of the long-term unemployed 
need extensive assistance, most experienced workers who received job search assistance and 
counseling obtain no additional benefit from short-duration training. Indeed, by 
unnecessarily delaying the return to work training could slow adjustment.3
I believe that the emphasis on training is largely a result of the erroneous view that 
displaced workers lack the skills needed to obtain relatively high paying jobs. That view is 
based on a kernel of truth that new jobs offering high pay require considerably more 
education and training than in the past. But, as noted above, this does not mean that the only 
jobs available require considerable retraining. Further, it is unreasonable to believe that a 
EDWAA training which is rarely as long as six months can provide high-paid, blue-collar, 
job losers with the skills needed to obtain "new" high-wage jobs.
My research, and that of others suggest that the earnings of dislocated high-wage, 
blue-collar workers permanently fall well below what they would otherwise have received, 
but still are within the range of most workers with similar education and experience. If 
training could substantially boost the earnings power of dislocated workers, there would be 
an enormous clamor for such training from workers who never held high-wage jobs.
A much more reasonable view of the capacity of training to raise wages is to assume 
the rate of return on such training would be about seven percent. Seven percent is at the 
high end of estimates of the rate of return from any type of education or training. Given a 
$5,000 investment by government coupled with a $15,000 investment in terms of foregone 
earnings by the trainee would raise annual earnings by $1,400.
In contrast, the expected return from helping manufacturing workers locate jobs that 
can use existing skills is close to $10,000. Following this line of reasoning to its logical
3 The basic point here is that most, but not all, of the long-term unemployed can be 
adequately helped by inexpensive job search assistance. Nevertheless, there is an important 
niche for short-duration training of experienced workers. For example, some workers can 
rapidly gain sufficient skill to induce employers to offer them jobs that otherwise would have 
gone to others. Also, some workers can boost basic education skills that greatly enhance 
future opportunities to learn on-the-job or in classroom programs. Periods of unemployment 
are ideal times to make those additions to human capital.
Also the value of vocational and basic educational training may be considerably 
greater for economically disadvantaged workers who never held good jobs. This is the main 
target of JTPA. Even if the value of job search assistance and counseling is undervalued for 
this group, the rationale for training disadvantaged workers is much stronger, and helping 
such workers find jobs without training is a less attractive option.
conclusion an investment in training of $140,000 would be needed to generate a similar 
$10,000 gain.
$140,000 is a lot of money, but it is precisely the type of investment made by anyone 
who attends college full-time instead of entering the full-time workforce. Few dislocated 
workers are in a financial position to make that type of investment. Thus, dislocated 
workers who want substantial retraining must do what a majority of community college 
students do combine training with work.
The need for income support while taking training suggests to me that DOL programs 
should be aimed at providing the long-term unemployed with a realistic assessment of how 
much they would benefit from retraining and how they could get that training, but at the 
same time, help workers find the best available jobs. In most communities there are 
sufficient retraining resources to make combining work with training a viable option.
The alternative of providing income support in addition to paying for retraining is 
likely to be prohibitively expensive. Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) is the only DOL 
program that even comes to providing adequate support for long-term training. In Missouri 
TAA eligibles taking training received on average a stipend of $20,000.
Further, providing stipends creates incentives to take training purely to receive 
income support. In Missouri it was unclear whether those who took training did so because 
they felt the training would have a high payoff, or because they felt the income support was 
more desirable than taking the best available job. This is hardly surprising. Prior to late 
1988 TAA training was voluntary, but TAA certified workers who took training could 
receive the equivalent of 76 weeks of UI payments over a three year period. In comparison, 
those who did not take training could receive at most 52 payments over a two year period.
The Benefits of Increased Flexibility
An attractive feature of the REAP program is that it would give each state wide 
discretion in selecting the types of services to provide and the mechanisms for delivering 
those services. As discussed above, vocational training is the only one of the three basic 
types of assistance that has received a substantial increase in resources. But training is 
relatively expensive, and is not obviously superior to other options. Thus, the REAP 
program has the potential to give states the flexibility needed to develop a more balanced 
approach.
In addition, state flexibility can provide the information needed to spot flaws and 
rapidly improve program design. Recently, the US Department of Labor and Congress have 
recognized that restrictions, such as severely penalizing EDWAA service providers who 
spend less than half their funds on vocational training, have been counter-productive. 
Similarly, there is growing recognition that EDWAA's emphasis on short duration training
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and quick placement may have induced creaming and reduced long-run gains. 4 But it has 
taken considerable time to act on this knowledge.
Measuring the Benefits of REAP
Giving wide discretion to the states would encourage considerable experimentation 
and provide opportunities to judge the value of treatments that vary considerably from those 
currently in widespread use. But the promise of learning a great deal about how best to aid 
the long-term unemployed would only come about if a concerted effort was made to critically 
evaluate the results of each state's efforts.
I have long been puzzled by the claim states act as "laboratories" for social 
experimentation. What distinguishes scientific inquiry is demonstrating at the outset that an 
experiment can adequately test a stated set of hypotheses, and then carefully collecting the 
data required to perform the specified test. In distinct contrast, states rarely adopt 
procedures to test the effectiveness of alternative treatments, or even collect the data needed 
to measure the effectiveness of the programs adopted.
In a period where states are scrambling for funds to keep programs operating it is 
understandable that evaluation would be considered a frill they could not afford. But given 
the substantial funding earmarked for REAP, it would be tragic to ignore evaluation of the 
new efforts.
A low-cost option would be to have the US-DOL evaluate the effectiveness of a range 
of REAP programs using administrative data. Evaluations of REAP using administrative 
data are likely to be exceptionally effective. First, REAP is aimed at workers who have 
registered for UI, and in most cases, ES services. Thus, considerable administrative data 
will be available for workers in this group who take advantage of REAP programs, and of 
great importance, a suitable comparison group of workers who do not use REAP. Second, 
the REAP program is targeted on workers with considerable work experience. This makes it 
likely that random assignment is not needed to control for selectivity bias that has plagued 
studies of workers with spotty work records. 5
4 See for example, "A Comparison of the Effectiveness of JTPA Training Programs 
Administered under Tuition vs. Performance-based Contracts" This recent DOL report 
prepared by Arnold Katz of the University of Pittsburgh and Robin Rogers of the Pittsburgh 
Private Industry Council (PIC) suggests stress on short-run "success" reduces long-run gains.
5 Despite the high likelihood of success whether or not evaluations without random 
assignment produce unbiased results should be tested by directly comparing results using 
non-experimental methods with those derived from a randomly selected comparison group.
Encouraging Innovative Programs and State Evaluations
Consideration also should be given to using REAP funds to improve the capacity of 
state's to evaluate REAP and other programs. Even more worthwhile would be setting aside 
a modest amount of REAP funds for use by the US-DOL to induce states to evaluate 
innovative programs. Although there is likely to be a great deal of natural variation, no state 
may be willing to risk substantial sums on a potentially effective, but unproven, approach.
One promising approach is the use of wage subsidies. An unintended side-affect of 
UI benefit programs is that they create disincentives to return to work. Such disincentives 
would be unimportant if workers ultimately were recalled or there were so few jobs available 
during a deep recession that job search was fruitless. But available evidence suggests that 
countering disincentive effects would be worthwhile.
The Illinois Bonus Experiment demonstrated that a re-employment bonus was highly 
cost-effective during the period when EB and FSC were in place, (but not cost-effective after 
those programs ended). Unfortunately, the evidence applies only to a period when the 
recovery from the recessions of the early 1980's was well underway. Thus, it is possible 
that the returns to job search would be considerably lower in the early and middle stages of a 
recession. The evidence cited above showing that there was considerable hiring in Pittsburgh 
during one of the worst declines in history, however, suggests the returns to job search, 
although reduced, would be sufficient to justify encouraging search.
Moreover, my ES research with Arnold Katz showed that the long-term unemployed 
who used the ES initially took relatively low paying jobs, but their earnings grew 
substantially over the next several years. If workers only focus on the wage at hiring and 
fail to recognize that the quicker they return to work the quicker their earnings will begin to 
grow, they will be particularly unlikely to accept available jobs. The fact that initial earnings 
often are only slightly above the level of UI benefits accentuates the possibility that UI will 
induce workers to act counter to their own long-run interests.
Compounding the problem is the possibility that long-duration unemployment has a 
"scaring" effect. Several studies suggest that employers are reluctant to hire workers who 
have experienced long-duration of unemployment, or alternatively joblessness itself depresses 
workers to the point the can not effectively search for work.
Perhaps the best evidence in favor of wage subsidies is that, based on the 
Pennsylvania dislocated worker study cited above, a subsidy paying half the difference 
between actual and prior earnings up to 75 percent of prior earnings would substantially 
increase the earnings of high-tenure dislocated workers. As an example of how the lack of 
solid information can lead to poor policy choices, the only wage subsidy demonstration in the 
US was turned down by Pennsylvania officials because they did not believe earnings losses of
the long-term unemployed were large enough to make responding to the above subsidy 
worthwhile.
Summary and Conclusions
The new bill does an admirable job in reaching the limits of what government can do 
to solve the most fundamental problems facing the long-term unemployed. By adjusting the 
EB trigger and establishing REAP it sets out a forward looking program that holds the 
promise of permanently reestablishing the balance between costs borne by the unemployed 
and those borne by society at large, as well as the balance among the three basic types of 
assistance.
Given the evidence that providing adjustment services to the long-term unemployed is 
cost-effective the emphasis on increasing funding is warranted. It is refreshing to see a 
proposal based on the premise government programs can have benefits greater than its costs, 
instead of judging a program purely on its cost.
Further, establishing a new program that gives states a great deal of flexibility will 
complement existing programs. Experience with EDWAA suggests that this program 
contains counter-productive restrictions that only now are being corrected.
Research also suggests that the traditional triad of cash payments, job search 
assistance, and retraining should be supplemented with wage subsidies or bonuses that 
encourage a rapid return to work. I strongly recommend setting aside funds to encourage 
introduction of wage subsidies and other innovative programs.
But one of my favorite adages is: "Before advocating any program imagine what 
would happen if it was implemented by your worst enemy". Thus, in my view the linchpin 
of the entire effort is insuring that programs developed with REAP funds are adequately 
evaluated.
We have plenty of evidence that good intentions are not enough. Program designers 
are fallible and, in the absence of solid evidence, too frequently base decisions on erroneous 
assumptions. Only by accurately measuring the effectiveness of various programs can we 
insure that the interests of the long-term unemployed will be adequately served.
Thus, I most strongly urge that the US Department of Labor be given the mandate 
and resources needed to evaluate the range of services available to the long-term 
unemployed. We now have the technical means to accurately carry out such evaluations at a 
minute fraction of the program cost.
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I, therefore, look forward to a future where this committee will lift the fog of 
misunderstanding over the value of service to the long-term unemployed at least as 
effectively as other committees have lifted the fog of war.
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well as the balance among the three basic types of assistance for the long-term unemployed: 
cash payments, job search assistance, and retraining. In addition, the bill provides the 
flexibility needed to develop new, highly effective, forms of assistance. But unless steps are 
taken to insure that states receive feedback on the effectiveness of various types of assistance 
the bill could fail to establish programs that would deliver adequate services to the long-term 
unemployed.
Reestablishing the balance between costs borne by the unemployed versus costs borne 
by society is appropriate. The availability of unemployment compensation and supportive 
services to aid the long-term unemployed seriously deteriorated over the past ten years. 
During this same period the substantial restructuring of major US industries increased the 
need for such assistance.
Through the REAP program the bill provides the means to restructure key institutions 
to effectively deal with future problems. This too is highly appropriate. Restructuring of the 
US economy will continue to cause major dislocations in response to the decline in domestic 
defense spending, as well as changes in international competition, such as those stemming 
from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Another positive aspect of the bill is that it gives states wide discretion in 
implementing effective programs. There is growing recognition that federal restrictions on 
state and local programs were counter-productive. But more could be done to encourage 
innovation. In addition to returning a portion of the UI payroll tax to the states, I suggest 
creating a separate fund to be distributed by the US Department of Labor for use by states to 
try-out, potentially highly effective, but unproven strategies. In particular, wage subsidies 
might dramatically reduce the costs of dislocation borne by workers and government. Yet, 
in the absence of federal assistance, states are unlikely to bear the risk of using new 
approaches.
The one glaring omission from this bill, however, is that it does nothing to insure that 
states competently monitor program effectiveness, and then overtime, modify the programs to 
better meet the needs of the long-term unemployed. Providing adequate feedback is a key 
aspect of effective policy design, but unfortunately, often overlooked. As a researcher I am 
acutely aware of the lack of solid information needed to refine policy instruments, but also 
am struck by the growth of our technical ability to provide reliable information at a tiny 
fraction of the total cost of these programs. Thus, my most important recommendation is for 
the US Department of Labor to be given the mandate and the resources needed to rigorously 
evaluate services under REAP and other programs to aid the long-term unemployed.
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